Jul 13 2009
Army Major Questions Obama’s Constitutional Eligibility to be Commander in Chief
As many of you know, when an officer is sworn into the military, he/she takes the Oath to defend the Constitution. That is, the officer is not just at the President’s disposal. In a report from world Daily Net, it appears that a case will be heard on July 16th, 2009, in “Federal court for the Middle District of Georgia from U.S. District Judge Clay D. Land.” The plaintiff, Major Stefan Frederick Cook, is in the Florida Army Reserves and has received orders to be deployed to Afghanistan.
Major Cook states that he needs to receive clarification, since if he were captured by the Taliban and it was found that the President is a usurper, he would not be treated as a POW, but as a “war criminal.”
Leo Donofrio, lawyer and author of Natural born Citizen pointed out to Major Cook’s lawyer, Dr. Orly Taitz, that due to the separation of powers, most likely the judicial system is not going to take up these matters. Donofrio says that the only method for removing a sitting President, other than impeachment is “quo warranto“. Specifically, that is under jurisdiction of the US Attorney for D.C. Donofrio sent the “quo warranto” to the former US Atty. Jeffrey Taylor, but he resigned in May without commenting on it. Channing Philips was appointed as his replacement.
According to Natural Born Citizen: “In Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 at 546 (1915), the Supreme Court interpreted the role of the AG and US attorney as follows: “The District Code still treats usurpation of office as a public wrong which can be corrected only by proceeding in the name of the government itself. It permits those proceedings to be instituted by the Attorney General of the United States and by the attorney for the District of Columbia. By virtue of their position, they, at their discretion and acting under the sense of official responsibility, can institute such proceedings in any case they deem proper. But there are so many reasons of public policy against permitting a public officer to be harassed with litigation over his right to hold office that the Code not only does not authorize a private citizen, on his own motion, to attack the incumbent’s title, but it throws obstacles in the way of all such private attacks. It recognizes, however, that there might be instances in which it would be proper to allow such proceedings to be instituted by a third person, but it provides that such “third person” must not only secure the consent of the law officers of the government, but the consent of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia before he can use the name of the government in quo warranto proceedings.“
